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In his important paper, 'Imagination in the 
Experience of Art', R.K. Elliott argues that imagina-
tion is evoked by paintings, poetry, novels but also, 
and perhaps more unexpectedly, by buildings. Imag-
ination is the power that animates St. Alban's cathe-
dral into a living animal: "The cathedral seems to ac-
quire a bodily posture, life, and intelligence of some 
sort, august and brooding."1 For Elliott this fanciful 
use of imagination is not mere self-indulgent play, 
for it expands our appreciation of the perceptual 
qualities of the cathedral. 
In this paper, I pursue Elliott's point and 
explore the role of imagination in the aesthetic re-
sponse to the urban environment of the city. I shall 
argue that imagination is the power which both 
structures and contextualises aesthetic appreciation 
of the urban environment. It achieves this through 
its creative powers, which include visualising, imag-
ining possibilities and the more particular power of 
metaphorical imagination. These capacities forge a 
link between what we pick out for appreciation 
through perception, and the background we bring to this, including associations, memories, 
and cultural and historical narratives. When these capacities are active in the aesthetic re-
sponse, I believe that they expand perception and deepen appreciation by engendering fuller 
participation with the aesthetic object. 
Perception
Before considering the role of imagination in the aesthetic response to the city, I first turn to 
the role of perception. Perception lies at the foundation of the aesthetic response, and in this 
sense, imagination begins in perception. Our imaginings are spawned by what we see, hear, 
smell, taste and feel, and for the most part our imaginings are tied to the perceptual qualities 
of the aesthetic object. 
In what ways does our aesthetic response begin with perception? One feature of our use 
of perception in the aesthetic response to the urban environment is its freedom from the con-
straints of instrumental interests. Both Kant and Dewey agree that perception in the aesthetic 
response is free from the preoccupations of desire and use. Dewey articulates this freedom in 
terms of 'fullness of participation' when he says that "Participation is so thoroughgoing that 
the work of art is detached or cut off from the kind of specialised desire that operates when we 
are moved to consume or appropriate a thing physically."2 What is significant about both ap-
proaches is their emphasis on the freedom of perception to aesthetically explore one's sur-
roundings for their own sake. While we are familiar with the relevance of this point to art, 
some might question its relevance to the urban environment. This particular environment is 
mainly composed of buildings with some explicit function - a church for worship, a library for 
holding and reading books, an office building for conducting business or government - and 
that function is key to the identity of the building qua aesthetic object. But concern for func-
tion need not dominate the aesthetic response, sometimes it will be in the foreground, 
sometimes in the background. 
My aesthetic response to Lancaster Castle, a landmark in the city where I live, in-
volves perceptual exploration of a huge mass of sooty sandstone, with round towers and a 
high, wide entrance. It is a grand, solid mass, expressive of strength, but at the same time dark 
and miserable. These judgements have perception as their starting point, and they are also 
informed by the knowledge that the castle was once used to imprison women accused of being 
witches, as well as the fact that the castle is still used as both as a court and a small prison. I also 
know that the castle was built as a fortress - thus to keep people out as much as to keep them 
in. Both bits of knowledge shape how I see the castle from an aesthetic perspective. In this 
sense, knowledge of the castle's function serves aesthetic interest, and for this reason in many 
cases we can expect the unconstrained participation of perception in the aesthetic response to 
the urban environment that we have come to expect in our encounters with art and the natu-
ral environment. 
This freedom helps to bring about another feature of perceptual engagement with 
the environment: the great variety of perspectives we can take up. Perceptual attention to the 
city is like a multi-sensory camera that zooms in on individual objects or the details of those 
objects. In the built environment, such as a city street, I might focus on the art deco goddesses 
watching over the street from the top of a high building. Up close and crouching amongst the 
crowd, I might feel the humid, cement-like smell of the pavement. Alternatively, we can de-
crease focus by viewing objects as aspects of a greater whole; people, cars, road signs, the 
smell of exhaust, all jumbled together in a corridor of tall buildings. The standpoint of these 
perspectives also offers variety, ranging from standing, sitting or crouching, perceiving from 
above or from below, to moving rapidly through the environment, as from the saddle of a 
bicycle. 
The variety of perspectives offered through perception may be more or less filled out 
with other elements of the aesthetic response. As illustrated by the castle example, we bring 
knowledge to what we perceive and this may serve to bring out particular aesthetic qualities of 
the object. But we may also bring very little knowledge to the experience, or be so captivated 
by the look of something that we experience the object purely through a sort of sensory im-
mersion. On the city street, especially one foreign to me, I may have little knowledge with 
which to interpret my surroundings, or I may be so overwhelmed by the sheer aesthetic im-
pact of the environment that in my appreciation I do not reach beyond surface qualities. 
Imagination 
Another element of the aesthetic response that fills out perception more or less is imagination. 
Aesthetic appreciation begins with perception, but it is very often expanded through the power 
of imagination. We use imagination's various capacities all of the time: we visualise and 'smell' 
the  perfect  meal  when  we  are  hungry;  imagine  what  it  is  like  to  be  in  someone  else's  shoes;  
imagine various possible outcomes to a problem; and make associations between objects. These 
same capacities are also important resources in the aesthetic response. In particular, 
imagination is a resource which expands and deepens aesthetic appreciation in two ways. First, it 
is a resource which we draw upon to meet the challenges of aesthetic engagement with the urban 
environment. It is a tool for creating new perspectives and fresh aesthetic interest in otherwise 
ordinary or familiar surroundings. Secondly, and more significantly, it structures and 
contextualises appreciation. Through imagination's creative, cohesive power, a range of 
experience is brought to perception, which serves to place the aesthetic object, as well as situate 
ourselves in relation to it. To set out the first of these ways in which imagination is an aesthetic 
resource, I turn to some of Kant's remarks in the Critique of  Judgment. 3  
For Kant, the aesthetic response is characterised by perception and the free play of imagination 
and understanding. He argues that imagination is free in the aesthetic response because it is 
free from its role in objective knowledge, which is to assist our power of understanding in 
concept-application. This freedom of imagination is significant for it provides us with a 
flexible tool which is untethered to the ends of knowledge or other practical ends. For example, 
a familiar walk or cycle on the way to work may attract little aesthetic interest, but it gains in 
aesthetic value when we try out fresh perspectives on the environment through which we move. 
Keen perceptual exploration alone can get us part of the way to finding aesthetic value here, e.g., 
as I notice the patchwork of geometrical shapes, viewed abstractly, of a row of buildings. 
Imagination takes off from this starting point to make this feature of the environment 
significant beyond its pleasing form. I enjoy the shapes by making associations to organic 
forms, or cultural artefacts, perhaps visualising Cezanne's paintings. I might imagine the roof-
tops as steps out of the city and into the sky, and see myself leaping up them. 
 
In the aesthetic response imagination is free to make associations which enrich per-
ception by presenting novel viewpoints, but I do not want to suggest that imagination ought 
to be given completly free rein, since many imaginings could be construed as self-indulgent, 
overly playful and thus function to trivialise the aesthetic object. Although such a response 
might be part of a game which engages us more intimately with our surroundings, it is inap-
propriate to aesthetic appreciation, since that requires valuing aesthetic qualities rather than 
merely seeking our own amusement. Kant was aware of this difficulty, and he suggested a so-
lution in the role of the understanding. In its free play with imagination, the understanding 
pulls imagination back from spreading its wings so far as to lose sight of the very qualities that 
cause its flight. In less Kantian terms, imagination's trajectory is choreographed by the per-
ceptual, intentional and cognitive qualities of the aesthetic object or environment. 
Imagination expands aesthetic appreciation in a second important way through its 
creative and cohesive powers. These powers serve appreciation by discovering affinities or 
making associations using images, and by selecting and foregrounding relevant background 
experience or knowledge. In these ways imagination adds to the content of perception, and 
thereby directs appreciation as it extends out from perception. Kant points to imagination as 
the source of discovering affinities and making associations in response to art, when it is 
stimulated to "spread itself over a multitude of kindred presentations." In particular, this 
comes through what he calls 'aesthetic attributes', the use of symbols in poems or paintings. 
These symbols evoke a host of images which highlight or bring out some aspect of the aesthetic 
object. 4 Kant argues that imagination is responsible for this because, in its free play, it is not 
constrained by the conceptual limits of the object. Imagination transcends these limits, and 
reaches out to bring novel, but related, images to bear on what we perceive.  4  
I would like to expand on these remarks to articulate another function of imagina-
tion in aesthetic appreciation, 'metaphorical imagining'. I view this activity as metaphorical 
because it involves bringing together two different things in novel ways - an aesthetic object 
or aspect of it with some image which is not an image of that object nor an image of another 
instance of that object. This type of imaginative activity can perhaps be best understood by 
considering its central role in the construction of metaphors. 
A recent definition of metaphor maintains that it is, "A verbal composition which, 
on  the  basis  of  novel  semantic  relations  among  its  components,  evokes  a  complex  and  pro-
ductive set of mental responses." 6 The role of imagination can be located in the creation of 
the novel relations between the different semantic relations that constitute the metaphor, but 
also, importantly, as a significant component of the mental response to the metaphor.  
The metaphor, 'Richard is a lion', is most likely the result of someone's observation that 
Richard has the qualities of a lion, namely, strength and courage. Imagination plays an 
important role in the actual construction of the metaphor because it enables the author of the 
metaphor to make the requisite association from one thing in the world to another, different 
thing. According to Max Black's terminology, a "metaphor works by applying to the principal 
subject [Richard] a system of associated implications characteristic of the subsidiary subject 
[lion]." 7 As I see it, 'associated implications', the commonplace meanings associated with each 
subject in the metaphor, are applied when the author uses imagination to think of possibilities 
for showing how the quality of one thing might be illuminated or disclosed through another 
thing. Such imaginings facilitate the leap beyond ordinary or mundane choices, and in this 
sense, imagination is essential to the metaphor because as a creative power it makes the relation 
novel and thus more meaningful. 
Black has argued that metaphors do not function to locate or highlight already existing 
similarities between things, rather metaphors actually create the similarities.8 He is not exactly 
right here because the similarities are not wholly created. To want to compare Richard to a lion 
depends upon recognising similar behaviour between Richard and lions. But the value of 
Black's point is that it highlights the creativity which underpins metaphor and distinguishes it 
from literal meaning. 9 Both in the making of a metaphor and in its reception, the affinities 
between the two objects are constructed. The creative work does not end with the author, for 
what makes metaphor work is as much dependent on its imaginative reception. The author 
builds a core of suggestive ideas for the association of two different things. The metaphor's 
success can be measured in part by the wealth, or lack of, imaginings in response to the relation 
that is made. In understanding a metaphor, imagination reacts to the suggestive core of ideas 
and creates further meaning, building on what is already there. I might im- 
 
agine Richard's voice as sounding like a lion's roar, deep, full and commanding respect. I 
might visualise Richard's gait as slow and purposeful, confident like a lion's. In this activity 
imagination's power can be described as both creative and associative. But metaphorical im-
agination is distinct from associative imagination because metaphor makes an extra demand 
on imagination, to try out new ways of seeing two things as similar which are otherwise taken 
to be quite different things.10 Associative imagination has a wider and less inventive range 
finding resemblances between both similar and dissimilar things. 
The points I have made here show how imagination functions in metaphor as a lin-
guistic utterance. But what happens when imagination functions in a non-linguistic context? 
If we can understand buildings as expressive of meaning, then we can see them as expressing 
metaphorical properties, properties discovered through metaphorical imagination.11 Meta-
phorical imagining is just that creative and inventive activity of imagination that discovers 
novel relations or resemblances between different objects, thereby revealing a particular 
quality about one of the objects (or both) which was otherwise unnoticed. In the urban aes-
thetic context, metaphorical imagination creates affinities between the built environment 
and other objects, environments, concepts and experience. 
For example, consider the view from inside a great cathedral - Chartres, Rouen, 
York or Washington. Apparently, Rodin remarked that when inside a cathedral the image of 
a  forest  came  to  mind  (and  in  the  forest,  he  felt  as  if  he  was  inside  a  cathedral).  The  light  
coming into the cathedral resembles light as it passes through rows of trees to reach the forest 
floor. Elliott embellishes Rodin's thoughts in the following description of the role of imagi-
nation: 
" ….   we see the columns of the nave as having a sort of organic life which we perceive (or imag-
ine) in trees; and our awareness of the walls of the nave recedes to the fringe of consciousness, 
so that  our sense of them as limits falls  into abeyance.  Similarly we cease to be aware of the 
roof as enclosure, and become peripherally aware of the sky as up there beyond the tangle of 
ribs or branches. Some associations of the forest may then be evoked, and of a sudden the 
enclosed cathedral world seems to be invaded by the open world of the forest. We experience 
a rush of associations, astonishment, a sense of privilege and freedom, and, since the world of 
the forest is a remembered world, perhaps a feeling of nostalgia. 12 
Elliott does not make very explicit another key aspect of this imaginative experience: how our 
perception of the cathedral gives us the same bodily feeling that  we  have  in  a  forest,  and  how  that  
feeling brings the world of the forest into the aesthetic response, thereby bringing out new 
aesthetic properties. The feeling of being enclosed from above evokes somatic images of being in 
dense pine forests which let in very little light. The feeling may be one of peace and Bum——J 
calm - the cathedral as a protected enclosure, a resting place for quiet reflection, an escape. This 
experience may metaphorically shape our next walk through a forest; where we might begin to see 
the forest as a cathedral, imbued with religious meaning, as the trees stretch high into the sky like 
the supports of a cathedral.  All of these imaginings of the cathedral (and the forest) give content 
to what we see and feel, but they also situate us in relation to the cathedral through associations 
with the forest, memories, and religious images which may be evoked for some individuals. 
Another example arises from my own experience. Lancaster University has recently built a 
library to house John Ruskin's work. One of my colleagues sees the building as a ship's bow.13 
Although I have not seen it in this way, it is an interesting and novel association which seems to 
fit. The perceptual qualities of a ship's bow and the building share something in common. The 
curved form of the building rises out of the flat-roofed buildings surrounding it like a ship's 
bow on the sea, and the lightness of its shape gives it a floating quality. Other metaphorical 
properties emerge from the association with a ship. The Library was built as a very special 
project, as a sort of flagship of the university's move from the past into the future of the next 
century. This point is underscored through the bitter irony that the Library was part of several 
building projects that caused a financial crisis which led to staff reductions. This makes the 
metaphorical  imagining  the  basis  of  seeing  the  building  as  a  ship's  bow,  and  also  as  an  explicit  
cultural metaphor. In so far as the Library can be seen as the flagship of the university, it symbolises 
the University's aim to move forward with the times, to take academic research and teaching into 
the next century, and so on. For others, the Library is an ironic symbol of poor management, or 




The examples I have offered thus far show different ways in which we use imagination in our 
rather pleasant encounters with the urban environment. But our aesthetic experience of the 
city is not always a delightful one; it often involves the feeling of the sublime, a feeling of awe 
tinged with fear. Many aspects of the city can induce this effect, an effect which locates the city 
as 'other' in our experience. Skyscrapers are perhaps the most typical example of the sublime   
in the city, but the sheer power and chaos of tangled throngs of people, cars, and other ob-        
stacles can create the feeling of excitement associated with the sublime. The opposite of this            
chaos, the barren emptiness of the business district at night, can just be ugly and frightening, 
but if one feels safe, the grand empty space might cause a feeling of awe or wonder. Here too 
imagination joins with perception to direct and contextualise appreciation of the sublimity of 
our surroundings. 
Kant's theory of the sublime provides some interesting ideas on imagination's role 
in this rather complex type of aesthetic response. First, the sheer size of the 'mathematically 
sublime' object, stretches imagination (and perception) to their very limits as they struggle 
to take in the object.14 Here, the activity of imagination is not characterised by the pleasant 
free play in response to an object with form or boundaries, but rather imagination is strained 
and agitated as it strives to apprehend the formlessness and boundlessness of the object.15 
For Kant, the 'violence' incurred on imagination by the object is what gives us the negative 
feeling of pleasure associated with the sublime. Although Kant's theory of the sublime is 
directed almost exclusively to nature, he offers an example from the urban environment, St. 
Peter's in Rome, which nicely illustrates this first use of imagination in the sublime. 
“ ...bewilderment or a kind of perplexity...is said to seize the spectator who for the first                    
time enters St. Peter's Basilica in Rome. For he has the feeling that his imagination is 
inadequate for exhibiting the idea of a whole, [a feeling] in which imagination reaches its 
maximum, and as it strives to expand that maximum, it sinks back into itself, but consequently 
comes to feel a liking [that amounts to an] emotion.16 
We can easily update Kant's example with a skyscraper. The eye is drawn upwards as far as we 
 
  
can see, but there is a feeling that we cannot take it all in, a feeling of being overwhelmed by its 
height. This activity of imagination is not metaphorical, because it struggles to apprehend the 
object, and thus cannot even reach the stage of discovering affinities. However, even in this 
struggle, imagination plays a vital role in this type of aesthetic appreciation. For it is the very 
failure of both perception and imagination to completely apprehend the object that leaves us 
feeling awe-struck at the sheer magnitude of the object. Aesthetic appreciation of sublimity is 
thus directed by both the agitation and the inability of our powers of apprehension. 
             In Kant's discussion of the dynamically sublime', imagination also plays an essential 
role in aesthetic appreciation, however, here there is greater scope for its capacities. In the 
dynamically sublime it is not so much the size of the object as its might or power that deter-
mines the sublime, a feeling which, here, results from finding the powerful object fearful. 
Imagination's role is crucial here, for it is through imagination that we can entertain the 
fearfulness of some object without actually fearing it. Kant says: 
Thus any spectator who beholds massive mountains climbing skyward, deep gorges with 
raging streams in them, wastelands lying in deep shadow and inviting melancholy 
meditation, and so on is indeed seized by amazement bordering on terror, by horror and a 
sacred thrill; but he knows he is safe, this is not actual fear: it is merely our attempt to incur it 
with our imagination in order that we may feel that very power's might... 17 
At  least  part  of  Kant's  meaning here  must  be  that  the  object  evokes  images  of  terror  which  
make us see the object as fearful and thus sublime, while we are under no threat whatsoever, 
provided that we view such objects from a safe place. Imagination's role is essential to this type 
of appreciation because it allows to us to imagine the threatening aspects of the object without 
the distraction of actually fearing for our lives. 
It is not difficult to apply this point to the sublime in the urban environment. We do 
find many aspects of the city fearful, and this can certainly be the basis of an aesthetic re-
sponse. We appreciate the fearfulness of the city because it creates the sort of excitement we 
associate with the sublime. The skyscraper example also illustrates the dynamically sublime, 
because we may also feel overwhelmed not just by size, but by the power expressed by the 
building. We see it as fearful, I think, because we imagine it falling on top of us, crumbling in an 
earthquake, or we imagine the scenario from the Towering Inferno' in which we are stuck high on 
the 50th floor with fire raging below us. Or we may get a feeling of fear from vertigo if we 
imagine looking down from the roof of the building. Through these images the power of the 
building is both realised and emphasised. Such images also provide a narrative for the experience, 
thereby giving content to the fearfulness we find. 
   Cities can be scary and alienating places18,  but we can also feel at home with this. We 
feel the otherness of cities but the same time a sense of place in them. One other important 
point about the dynamically sublime shows why, I think, we often feel this way. Kant argues that 
imagination not only plays a crucial role in realising the fearfulness of sublime objects, but also 
in realising human potential in the face of nature's might. The negative pleasure of the sublime 
gives way to a positive feeling in the recognition of our strength as free and rational moral 
beings. In relation to nature, I object to Kant's apparent claim that in the sub 
lime we feel superior to nature as moral beings, for it wrongly assumes both that we are not 
part of nature, and that nature is not part of the moral community. However, in relation to 
the city, Kant's remarks offer some insight into how the sublime might characterise how we 
feel at once both alienated and at home in the city.  
Walking through an urban corridor formed by skyscrapers towering above on either side 
can be an alienating experience. The high-tech surfaces of glass and metal are a cool contrast to 
the  warm,  doughy  flesh  of  human  bodies.  The  eye  is  drawn  up  and  out  of  its  typical  forward-
looking position, with the head thrown back, mouth agape, as if walking through some huge 
hollow cavern. Alternatively, if our attention is captured by the hustle and bustle at eye-level, on 
the street, we may find ourselves pushing through masses of obstacles, as if fighting through a 
dense jungle. Both cases are potentially sublime; we feel negative pleasure in respect of the 
anxiety caused by the otherness of the tall buildings or the mass of obstacles, and positive pleasure 
emerges because we enjoy engaging in the challenge of its otherness, which we may also do 
through imagination. We might imagine ourselves leaping the tall buildings in a single bounce, or 
as a great adventurer successfully navigating the jungle, or less extravagantly, we simply imagine 
aspects of our day-to-day routine that anchor us in these 
surroundings. Such imaginings attach us to these otherwise alienating places because we are 
able to see ways in which they are both exciting and inviting, and thus ways in which we fit in. 
A sense of place 
In all of the ways I have outlined above imagination is a resource which directs, contextualises 
and enriches aesthetic appreciation of the urban environment. Some of us will use this re-
source consciously, others unconsciously. Likewise, our aesthetic responses will range from 
'imaginatively thin', in which sensory immersion is dominant to 'imaginatively thick' aesthetic 
responses where imagination dominates. In cases where imagination is active, it enables us to 
reach beyond perception to bring associations, memories, and inventive images into the 
aesthetic response. These imaginings make connections between ourselves and the object of 
aesthetic interest. As a resource in aesthetic appreciation imagination provides a backdrop 
for the object of aesthetic interest, both in terms of how that object relates to its surroundings 
and in terms of how we relate to that object. It is in this way that imagination places us in rela-
tion to the urban environment. 
To emphasise this in relation to the role of metaphorical imagining, it is worth 
                                 drawing out a valuable point from metaphor theory. It has been argued that metaphors not 
only help to orient us in our environment by giving meaning to our environment, but they 
also create intimacy with our environment and signal a sense of community within it. On 
metaphor, Arto Haapala writes: 
     One should not underestimate the social relevance of this kind of communication. It 
works in many fields and creates ties not clearly seen or even realized. Even though they 
are not always perceived, their effect is obvious. They do not usually function at the 
articulated level of a language. This does not diminish their power, but rather increases it. 
Those who get the point and are within the community feel a kind of immediate, 
spontaneous togetherness. 19 
In so far as metaphorical imagination plays a role in aesthetic appreciation of the urban envi-
ronment, it engenders intimacy and community feeling. Although it involves the use of met- 
aphors in imaginative activity rather than speech this should not weaken the point. Aesthetic 
appreciation is a shared practice, and the various aspects of the aesthetic response, even those 
which are mental, underlie a public activity. Furthermore, even if I do not share my response 
with anyone else, the response is rooted in a cultural practice which draws on the material 
which creates metaphors. In the very act of creating metaphors I draw on connections to my 
environment and my community. So metaphorical imagining gives us a sense of place, or at 
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